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Non-technical Summary
The paper analyzes the behavior of venture capitalists in Germany
and their exit via initial public offerings (IPOs). It is based on a
unique hand-collected database of all venture-backed IPOs on Ger-
many’s Neuer Markt. Particularly, the history of the pre-IPO venture
capital financing and the venture capitalists’ selling activities in the
course of IPOs are examined.
We look at the differences between German and non-German VC firms
in detail. German venture capitalists strongly prefer German firms to
companies from abroad. The sectoral structure of their portfolios dif-
fers from that of foreign venture capital firms. They back significantly
smaller offerings with a lower capital increase at the IPO. The pre-
IPO and post-IPO shareholdings of the group of venture capitalists
are lower and their selling intensity at the IPO is higher when a Ger-
man firm is the lead venture capitalist. Non-German VC firms employ
significantly more investment rounds before they take their portfolio
firms public, they invest in firms in earlier stages and finance them
longer than German venture capitalists. They also syndicate more.
German venture capitalists commit themselves to hold their shares af-
ter the IPO for longer periods than venture capital firms from abroad.
The differences in the fundraising process, experience and reputation
of German venture capital firms deliver hints for the explanation of
some of these issues.
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Abstract: Using a unique, hand-collected database of all venture-
backed firms listed on Germany’s Neuer Markt, we analyze the his-
tory of venture capital financing of these firms before the IPO and the
behavior of venture capitalists at the IPO. We can detect significant
differences in the behavior and characteristics of German vs. foreign
venture capital firms. The discrepancy in the investment and divest-
ment strategies may be explained by the grandstanding phenomenon,
the value-added hypothesis and certification issues.
German venture capitalists are typically younger and smaller than
their counterparts from abroad. They syndicate less. The sectoral
structure of their portfolios differs from that of foreign venture capital
firms. We also find that German venture capitalists typically take
companies with lower offering volumes on the market. They usually
finance firms in a later stage, carry through fewer investment rounds
and take their portfolio firms public earlier. In companies where a
German firm is the lead venture capitalist, the fraction of equity held
by the group of venture capitalists is lower, their selling intensity at
the IPO is higher and the committed lock-up period is longer.
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1 Introduction
This paper deals with the behavior of venture capitalists in Germany
and their exit via initial public offerings (IPOs), which are generally
considered to be the most profitable divestment channel of venture
capital firms (see e.g. Bygrave and Timmons, 1992 and Gompers,
1995). Another reason for our focus on this exit channel is the easy
access to data on venture-backed IPOs in Germany (compared to
venture-backed firms that stay private). The main sources of infor-
mation are issuing prospectuses of firms going public. They contain
information on the firm, the structure of its pre-IPO financing and
the preplanned features of the offering. Our analysis is based on a
unique hand-collected database of all venture-backed IPOs on Ger-
many’s Neuer Markt throughout its short, but very turbulent history.
The enormous increase in the venture capital (VC) investment activi-
ties in Germany came along with the setting up of the Neuer Markt in
March 1997. However, after a remarkably positive development, par-
ticularly in the second half of 1999 and the first half of 2000, the issu-
ing activities on Germany’s Neuer Markt stopped almost completely
in the second half of 2001. Between August 2001 and December 2002
only one firm went public on Germany’s Neuer Markt. The Nemax 50
index fell during one and a half years by more than 90 %. Finally, the
Neuer Markt was closed in June 2003.
We examine the history of the venture capital financing of firms listed
on the Neuer Markt and analyze the venture capitalists’ selling activ-
ities in the course of IPOs. Venture capitalists maintain their share-
holdings beyond the IPO. Unfortunately, it is not possible to document
the development of the capital structure after the IPO with high ac-
curacy. The available databases are very imprecise and contain gaps.
To our knowledge it is impossible to find out how the divestment pro-
cess of venture capitalists in Germany continues after the IPO and the
expiration of the lock-up period. Therefore, we concentrate on the in-
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vestigation of the pre-IPO venture capital financing and the behavior
of venture capitalists at the IPO.
The existing empirical research on the venture capitalists’ exit deci-
sions in Germany and Europe is limited. It may be divided into two
main areas. On the one hand, there are several papers that compare
venture-backed and non venture-backed IPOs: Franzke (2001), Kraus
(2002) and Mayer (2001) deal with the underpricing on Germany’s
Neuer Markt ; Bottazzi and Da Rin (2001) look at the differences in
e.g. corporate growth and funds raised (data for European firms); Au-
dretsch and Lehmann (2002) demonstrate differences in growth and
the structure of balance sheets for companies on Germany’s Neuer
Markt. These studies use publicly available data. On the other hand,
there is empirical research based on an individual data collection via
e.g. questionnaires designed for that purpose. This approach makes
it possible to consider other exit channels for which publicly available
data do not exist. The determinants of the choice of a particular exit
channel by the venture capitalists (trade sale, IPO, liquidation) are
analyzed by Schwienbacher (2001) and Cumming (2002). Our paper
is based on publicly available data but does not deal with the com-
parison of venture-backed and non venture-backed IPOs. It considers
the differences within the group of venture-backed IPOs.
Our contribution to the empirical research is threefold. Firstly, we col-
lected a unique database of the pre-IPO venture capital financing of all
venture-backed IPOs on the Neuer Markt in Germany from its foun-
dation in 1997 to its closing in 2003. Our hand-collected database
of venture-backed IPOs and their financiers consists of information
from several sources. We offer a detailed set of descriptive statistics
of venture-backed IPOs on Germany’s Neuer Markt. Hereby, we dis-
tinguish between 3 different definitions of “venture capital” - broad,
narrow and pure definitions.
Secondly, we look at the following less explored research topics:
2
• The venture capitalists’ decision on exit timing.
Venture-backed firms go public after having been financed by ven-
ture capital for different time horizons, after a different number
of investment rounds and in different stages of their firms’ lives.
We identify the main determinants of the duration of the pre-IPO
venture capital financing in Germany.
• The consideration of the IPO as a “partial” exit.
Venture capitalists usually exit only partially at the IPO and
commit themselves to hold part of their shares for several months
beyond the IPO (lock-up). There are large differences in the level
of these post-IPO shareholdings and the length of the committed
lock-up period among venture capitalists. We investigate how the
decision on the lock-up level is related to the timing of the IPO
and the features of the VC financing.
Thirdly, we demonstrate significant differences in the investment pat-
terns and the characteristics between German and non-German VC
firms. Lower equity holdings, smaller average offering size and shorter
financing periods, which characterize German venture capitalists in
our sample, might be explained by the grandstanding phenomenon
theoretically derived by Gompers (1993) and empirically analyzed by
Gompers (1996). According to the grandstanding hypothesis, younger
VC firms take their portfolio firms public earlier (after shorter financ-
ing periods) than established VC firms, in order to increase their repu-
tation and be able to attract capital for new funds. Since German VC
firms are typically younger and smaller than foreign firms investing
in Germany, Gompers’ hypothesis could offer an explanation for their
investment patterns.
Another explanation for some of the differences in the investment and
divestment strategies of German and non-German VC firms is based
on a value-added hypothesis. Venture capitalists offer a combined
provision of capital and managerial experience (see e.g. Casamatta,
2003). They monitor strategic and managerial decisions, tend to take
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an active role in advising the firm and providing it with valuable busi-
ness contacts. Most of German VC firms are very young whereas
the majority of VC firms from abroad are established companies with
experience. After building-up or restructuring a portfolio company,
the capabilities of young VC firms with low experience to add value
through further management support are lower than that of experi-
enced venture capital firms. Hence, inexperienced VC firms may want
to exit earlier since, after a certain period, their comparative advan-
tage to potential new investors is not very high whereas experienced
VC firms may prefer to exit later (see Tykvova´, 2003 for a theoret-
ical model). While increasing the value of the portfolio firm over a
longer horizon, experienced VC firms can substantially raise its val-
uation. Young VC firms may prefer to turn their shares into cash
earlier and invest it in other firms to which they can add more value.
Because of their relatively little experience, they may prefer to invest
in companies in a later stage in which the needs for the non-monetary
contribution by the venture capitalists are lower than in younger firms.
Thus, the value-added hypothesis helps explain the shorter investment
durations and the later stage focus by German venture capitalists. It
may also serve as an explanation for the different sectoral structure of
the portfolios of German and non-German VC firms.
Both the grandstanding and the value-added hypotheses probably play
a role in explaining the differences between German and non-German
VC firms. To distinguish between them, we would have to take a
closer look at the fundraising process of German venture capital firms
and the role that reputation plays here. Fundraising in Germany is,
for a large part, organized differently and it seems likely that it does
not play such an important role as in the US, since in Germany the
large fraction of funds are not independent private funds but rather
subsidiaries of insurance companies and banks and often organized
as public-private partnerships (see Bascha and Walz, 2002). Such
institutional arrangements may result in an easier access to new funds.
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German venture capitalists use lock-up periods that are longer than
prescribed by the Rules and Regulations Neuer Markt (“Regelwerk
Neuer Markt”) more often than foreign VC firms. We argue that the
reason for this is that foreign VC firms have a higher reputation at
stake. Their presence helps certificate the quality of their portfolio
firms. German VC firms are younger and smaller, and thus may want
to signal quality by locking themselves in for a longer period of time.
In a seminal paper on signaling as a means of information transfer
between the insider and the uninformed new investors, Leland and
Pyle (1977) show that the insider’s willingness to retain shares can
serve as a signal of the project quality. Brav and Gompers (2003)
demonstrate that in the US insiders of firms that are associated with
greater potential for moral hazard lockup their shares for a longer
period of time. Hence, signaling and certification issues may offer an
additional explanation for the differences between German and non-
German VC firms.
We employ descriptive statistics, hazard rate models and Tobit regres-
sions to study the venture capitalists’ behavior. The structure of the
rest of the paper is as follows: section 2 will offer a short overview
of the data, descriptive statistics on a wide set of variables will be
presented in section 3 and regression results will be reported in sec-
tion 4. Section 5 will discuss the relevance of the value-added, the
grandstanding and the certification hypotheses for our data. Finally,
section 6 will conclude. When appropriate, we compare our results to
the outcomes of other empirical studies which are based on US data.
2 Data sources
Our analysis of the venture capitalists’ behavior is based on a unique
hand-collected database of venture-backed IPOs on Germany’s Neuer
Markt. We obtained the data from several sources. The information
on the development of the structure of the firms’ equity, the duration
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and history of the VC financing before the IPO, the committed lock-up
period, the firm characteristics (e.g. age) and the preplanned offering
features (offering size with distinction between old and new shares,
available greenshoe, etc.) was collected from the listing prospectuses
of the companies. Sometimes the listing prospectus did not contain a
detailed description of the development of the firm’s equity structure.
In those cases, the VentureXpert database was searched through for
missing data on the VC financing. From the Deutsche Bo¨rse AG, we
received data concerning the IPO (e.g. date of the IPO, offer price,
first price, exhausting of the greenshoe, the classification of the branch,
names of Designated Sponsors2 and underwriters, etc.). All financial
data before 1999 were converted into Euros. We considered only “real”
IPOs. Hence, we excluded firms that were listed on another exchange
when going public on Germany’s Neuer Markt.
In its short history, there were 327 IPOs on Germany’s Neuer Markt.
Based on the indication by the Deutsche Bo¨rse AG, that provided us
with a database of venture-backed IPOs, nearly 55 % of them (179
companies) were venture-backed. We refer to the indication by the
Deutsche Bo¨rse AG as the broad definition of VC. Using a narrower
definition of VC (firms affiliated at a venture capital association), we
could indicate 139 (42.5 % of all IPOs) venture-backed IPOs (here-
inafter denoted by: narrow definition of VC). However, when we ex-
cluded the financiers who were engaged only in bridge financing3 from
this group, 86 issuers (26.3 %) remained (pure VC). The number of
IPOs for the different definitions of VC, sorted by year, is reported in
table 1.
The shareholder structure (prior to and immediately after the IPO)
and, hence, the venture capitalists’ fraction of equity and number of
shares held were found in the listing prospectuses (for each venture
2Each share on the Neuer Markt should have at least two Designated Sponsors. Their main
task is to provide liquidity for the trading of this security.
3When the VC financing started less than a year before the IPO and, simultaneously, more
than two years after the firm’s foundation, we labelled it as bridge financing.
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capitalist). For each firm, we collected the data on the venture capi-
talists’ shareholdings for all three definitions of venture capital. The
VC firm which held the largest share of the equity prior to the IPO
was labelled the lead venture capitalist.
The data on venture capitalists (fund and VC firm size, affiliation(s),
age) were brought together from various sources: The VentureXpert
database, the directories of the German, European and US venture
capital associations (BVK, EVCA, NVCA) and Webpages of VC firms
on the Internet. The reputation coefficient is based equally on the size
and the age of the VC firm.
The reputation of an underwriter depends on his activities as the
leading underwriter (the number of new issues on the Neuer Markt
and their volume in the previous period) and is determined yearly.
The reputation of a designated sponsor is based equally on the number
of his mandates on the Neuer Markt and on his rating by the Deutsche
Bo¨rse AG in the preceding period and is set up quarterly.
In what follows, we will present our results separately for each of the
three groups mentioned above. When appropriate, we will compare
our findings from the German market to that of the US. The compari-
son will be based on the results by Megginson and Weiss (1991), resp.
Barry et al. (1990). These papers will hereinafter be denoted by MW,
resp. BM.
3 Descriptive statistics
We divide the firms into two subgroups depending on whether or not
the lead venture capitalist is German. For both of these subgroups and
for each of the three definitions of VC, table 3 presents descriptive
statistics (mean, number of observations) on a number of variables
concerning the characteristics of the firms (Panel A) and the IPO
(Panel B), the pre-IPO venture capital financing (Panel C) and the
venture capitalists’ behavior at the IPO (Panel D). We will discuss
7
Panels A and B in subsection 3.1 and Panels C and D in subsection
3.2. We conduct a standard t-test to analyze differences in means
between the two subgroups. Especially in cases where samples are
small and the underlying distributions are not normal, it may not be
appropriate to compare means. Therefore we also use the Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test to analyze the equality of medians. The list of all
dummy variables mentioned in the paper can be found in table 2.
3.1 The characteristics of the firms and the IPO
On average, the firms in our sample are 11.6 years old when they go
public (12.1 for the narrow definition, 11.9 for pure VC), compared to
8.6 years in the US (see MW). Companies in which a German firm is
the lead venture capitalist are younger when going public than firms
backed by lead VC firm from abroad. The difference, however, is not
significant. For the broad definition of VC, 41 firms (22.9 %) belong
to the internet industry, 34 (19.0%) to technology, 22 (12.3 %) to soft-
ware and the same number to biotechnology, medical technology &
health care, 21 (11.7 %) to IT services, 19 (10.6 %) to media & enter-
tainment, 10 (5.6 %) to telecommunications, 8 (4.5 %) to industrials
& industrial services and 2 (1.1 %) to financial services. In that part
of their portfolio which they take public on the Neuer Markt, lead VC
firms from Germany have a lower fraction of internet and software
firms, compared to lead venture capitalists from abroad, whereas the
share of firms from the branches media & entertainment and IT ser-
vices is higher. The differences in the representation of the branches
internet, software and media & entertainment are significant only for
one definition of VC and then only at the 10 % significance level. The
difference for IT services is significant twice, at the 5 % and at the 10
% level.
The majority of venture-backed firms that go public on the Neuer
Markt are located in Germany (84.9 % for the broad definition of
VC). Logically, for all three definitions of VC, the portfolio of German
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venture capitalists consists of a significantly larger fraction of German
firms than the portfolio of foreign VC firms (at the 1 % significance
level).
For the broad definition, the average size of a firm (nominal share
capital) after the capital increase via IPO is 9.27 Mil. Euros. The
average book value before the IPO is 6.12 Mil. Euros and the average
market value at the IPO reaches 278.3 Mil. Euros. Firms backed by
a lead VC firm from Germany are smaller. Particularly the difference
in the market values is highly significant (for the broad and narrow
definitions). Book-to-market ratios are not significantly different.
For broad and narrow definitions of VC, the offering size of firms
backed by a lead VC firm from Germany is significantly smaller, both
in shares and in Euros. The average number of shares offered at the
IPO is 2.59 Mil.; the average market value of the offering reaches 53.4
Mil. Euros (for the broad definition of VC; without greenshoe). In
firms backed by lead venture capitalists from Germany, the fraction
of old shares on the total offering is higher, although not significantly.
For all venture-backed firms it reaches 21.0 %.
The available greenshoe in shares and in Euros, the relative available
greenshoe (in % of the total offering) and the used greenshoe in shares
and in Euros are significantly higher for firms backed by a non-German
VC firm. The offer price and the first price do not differ significantly.
For all three definitions of VC, the average underpricing4 is higher for
firms backed by lead venture capitalists from Germany. However, the
difference is not significant in either case.
3.2 The pre-IPO venture capital financing and the behavior
of VC firms during the IPO
The descriptive statistics on the variables discussed in this subsection
can be found in Panels C and D of table 3. The pre-IPO venture
4Underpricing is defined as: (first price - offer price)/offer price ∗ 100 %.
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capital financing lasts 19.7 months on average (18.2 for the narrow
definition, 28.9 for pure VC). For the broad and the narrow definitions
of VC, the German venture capitalists take their portfolio firms public
significantly earlier than their non-German counterparts.
One important feature of venture capital financing is staging. The
firms do not receive the entire investment sum at the beginning, but
rather in stages corresponding to significant developments in the life
of the company (e.g. the development of a prototype, the first produc-
tion, etc.). The capital invested at each point should be sufficient to
bring the company to the next stage of its development. The venture
capitalist’s option to stop the financing helps mitigate agency costs.
In our sample, lead venture capitalists from abroad carry through sig-
nificantly more investment rounds on average than venture capitalists
from Germany (for the broad and the narrow definition of VC), pro-
viding their portfolio firms more often with fresh capital, before they
take their portfolio firms public.
Syndication with other venture capitalists improves the portfolio di-
versification of a VC firm which can, with a limited amount of re-
sources, participate in more projects. Additionally, Brander, Amit,
and Antweiler (2002) confirm that syndicated projects offer higher
returns than projects that are financed by only a single venture capi-
talist. Between 51.1 - 56.2 % (depending on the VC definition) of the
firms in our sample are financed via a syndicate of several VC funds.
Table 4 shows the distribution of the number of VC funds per firm.
The average number of VC funds in a venture-backed firm at the IPO
is 2.7 for the broad definition (2.3 for the narrow definition, 2.4 for
pure VC) compared to 3.0 in the BM sample. When we consider only
funds of different VC companies as a syndicated investment, only be-
tween 40.5 - 51.7 % (depending on the VC definition) of investments
are syndicated. The results differ significantly between German and
non-German VC firms. Lead venture capitalists from Germany syn-
dicate less. For foreign VC firms, the syndication at the funds’ level
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reaches 72.0 % and the average number of VC funds in a company
is 3.8 whereas in firms where a German venture capitalist is the lead
investor, only 44.7 % of investments are syndicated and the average
number of venture capital funds is 1.9 (broad definition). The differ-
ence between foreign and domestic lead investors for both variables,
the number of VC funds and the number of VC firms per portfolio
company, is significant for all definitions of VC. For broad and nar-
row definitions, the non-German VC firms start their investments in
significantly earlier firm stages than German venture capitalists.
Typically, the venture capitalists take concentrated equity positions.
In our sample, the broad group of VC firms owns 32.0 % (the narrow
definition: 26.0 %, pure VC: 29.6 %) of the pre-IPO equity of the
issuer on average. This is slightly less than in the US where venture
capitalists hold 36.6 % (MW), resp. 34.3 % (BM). In our sample, large
differences between non-German and German venture capitalists exist
(for the broad and the narrow definition of VC). The average pre-
IPO share of a group of venture capitalists under a lead VC firm
from abroad amounts to 38.3 %, 32.6 %, resp. 32.8 % for broad,
narrow, resp. pure VC and, hence, is similar to the results presented
by BM and MW; whereas if a lead venture capitalist is a German
firm, the venture capitalists’ share on the equity is significantly lower.
The fraction of firms in which the group of venture capitalists’ holds
large equity positions (50% of equity and more) prior to the IPO is
significantly larger in the subsample of lead VC firms from abroad.
For the broad definition of VC, this fraction amounts to 29.3 % for
foreign and 10.7 % for German venture capitalists. MW report 28 %
and BM 24.4 % for the US (see table 5). If we consider the narrow,
resp. pure definition, this share further reduces to 17.5 %, resp. 12.8
% for foreign VC firms and to 6.6 %, resp. 10.8 % for lead venture
capitalists from Germany.
We can document significant differences in the total pre-IPO venture
capitalists’ holdings between the two subgroups. However, the respec-
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tive shares of the single lead venture capitalists are not significantly
different. The explanation of this phenomenon is that lead venture
capitalists from Germany syndicate less and, hence, the holdings of a
group of venture capitalists are lower, in spite of the fact that there
are no significant differences in the shareholdings between single lead
VC firms in both groups.
The venture capitalists maintain their investment beyond the IPO.
After the IPO (and the capital increase), they retain 18.6 % (the
narrow definition: 14.4 %, the pure VC: 16.2 %) of shares and, on
average, they even increase their shareholdings during the IPO. This
result, however, is influenced particularly by one firm where the ven-
ture capitalists massively raise their shareholdings (more than 150
times!). In 10 out of 179 firms (broad definition), the venture capital-
ists’ shareholdings increase during the IPO (see table 6). The increase
in shareholdings is typically due to the conversion of convertible se-
curities at the IPO. If we consider only shares owned by the venture
capitalists prior to the IPO, they retain 76.2 % of them beyond the
IPO on average. When the lead VC firm is German, the group of
venture capitalists sells a larger fraction of the pre-IPO holdings at
the IPO on average. The difference is significant only for the broad
definition. The behavior of the VC firms in the US, documented in
MW, is very different: Here, the venture capitalists sell only about 8
% of their pre-IPO holdings at the IPO. In the majority of firms in
the US (56.7 %), the venture capitalists do not sell any shares at all
during the IPO whereas in Germany this is true in only less than 30
% of the cases (without significant differences between firms backed
by a German vs. non-German lead venture capitalist).
If we consider only firms in which venture capitalists sell some or all
of their old shares at the IPO, we can detect significant differences in
the fraction sold by the VC firms between companies where a German
VC firm is the lead venture capitalist and firms in which a foreign VC
firm holds the largest share. When backed by a lead VC firm from
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Germany, a significantly higher fraction of old shareholdings is sold by
the VC firms at the IPO.
The lock-up period prescribed by the Rules and Regulations Neuer
Markt, in which old investors are not allowed to sell their old shares,
lasts six months. However, in more than 40 % of venture-backed firms,
some or all old investors commit themselves not to sell their shares
for a period longer than six months. There are significant differences
between both subgroups. German VC firms employ a longer lock-
up period in every second firm, whereas lead venture capitalists from
abroad do this in only every third to fourth firm.
We divide the history of Germany’s Neuer Markt into three periods.
The starting phase with a low issuing activity, from the launching of
this market segment in March 1997 to the end of February 1999, is
classified as a cold issue period. The time horizon between March
1, 1999 and November 30, 2000, in which the number of firms going
public and prices exploded, is the only hot issue period. Afterwards
the prices and issuing activities crashed down and have never recov-
ered. Thus, the period since December 1, 2000 is labelled a cold issue
period. The IPOs in our sample are heavily concentrated in the hot
issue phase. More than 76 % of the firms in our sample went public
in this phase. There are no significant differences in the timing of the
IPO in hot and cold issue periods between German and non-German
venture capitalists.
Large economically and statistically significant differences between the
investment patterns of German and foreign VC firms exist. However,
among pure venture capitalists, the similarities between both sub-
groups increase substantially. Here, the only significant differences are
in the preference for domestic firms, the greenshoe level, the post-IPO
share of venture capitalists as a group, the length of the committed
lock-up period, the syndication and the fraction of software firms in
the portfolio.
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We can detect significant differences not only in the behavior but also
in the features of the German and non-German VC firms. The former
are typically younger and smaller. We compute a reputation coefficient
based on the age and size of the VC companies. The summary results
are shown in table 7. The reputation scale ranges from 1 to 5, where 1
is the best and 5 the worst reputation. The age and the size are both
given an equal weight of 50 %. German VC firms have a significantly
higher reputation coefficient (=lower reputation) than foreign venture
capitalists. A large part of investments from foreign VC firms is con-
centrated in the hands of 3i Group plc and its subsidiaries. They are
by far the most frequent financier in our sample. They are the lead
VC firm in 11.2 % (18.0 %, 23.8 %) of the venture-backed companies
listed on Germany’s Neuer Markt. Together, as a lead VC investor or
as a part of the financing consortium, 3i holds shares of 32 firms in
our sample of venture-backed firms (broad definition).
4 Regression Results
4.1 Timing of the IPO
We next explore the determinants of the duration of the pre-IPO ven-
ture capital financing in a multivariate regression approach. For each
of the three definitions of VC, we conduct a hazard rate analysis to
model the duration between the first venture capitalist’s equity hold-
ings and the IPO, employing two commonly used parametric models
(Weibull and exponential) and one semi-parametric model (Cox pro-
portional hazard model). The advantage of the semiparametric model
is that it involves minimal distributional assumptions (Cox, 1972).
The description of these models is presented in Appendix. All three
models deliver very similar results. It is a good indicator of the ro-
bustness of these estimations.
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Differences in the consulting intensity of projects as well as in the
venture capitalists’ experience and their impact on the duration of
the pre-IPO venture capital financing have been modelled theoreti-
cally by Tykvova´ (2003). One of the empirical implications of this
model is that more experienced venture capitalists finance their port-
folio firms longer before they bring them public than less experienced
VC firms. In the estimations here, we use the German VC dummy
and, alternatively, the reputation coefficient as proxies for experience.
Due to differences in the demands for venture capitalists’ consulting
services, we expect differing lengths of the pre-IPO venture capital
financing periods among industries. Therefore, dummy variables for
industries are included in the regressions.
Firstly, we estimate the models with a large matrix of dependent
variables (“full” models). This matrix consists of a quality variable
(market-to-book ratio) and a set of dummy variables for industries,
domestic dummy, German VC dummy and start-up dummy (results
not reported here). With the help of the Akaike information criterion
we then determine the optimal size of the matrix of explanatory vari-
ables. For every single definition of venture capital, the appropriate
variables resulting from the use of the Akaike information criterion
are the same in all three model specifications (Weibull, exponential
and Cox). For the broad definition of VC, the following dummy vari-
ables are included: German VC, start-up and three of the branches
dummy variables. For the narrow definition, the dependent variables
are nearly the same as for the broad definition, with the exception of
one of the branches dummy variables that is removed. For pure VC,
only two variables (branches dummy variables) remain.
We report regression outcomes in table 8. Our results provide further
evidence for the different behavior of German venture capitalists. The
German VC dummy belongs to the regression (except for pure VC)
and its coefficient is always positive at a high significance level. Ger-
man VC firms finance their portfolio firms for shorter periods before
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they take them public. If we, in spite of the Akaike criterion, included
this variable to the estimations for pure VC, its coefficient would have
the same sign as in the regressions for broad and narrow definitions but
would not be significant. Firms from the branches internet and me-
dia & entertainment are financed for significantly shorter periods. For
broad and narrow definitions of venture capital, the investment in a
start-up company leads to longer financing periods. Additionally, the
telecommunications firms are taken public earlier (broad definition).
Simple OLS regressions lead to similar results as the hazard rate mod-
els discussed above. For all three definitions of venture capital, the
variables included (here, as well, Akaike criterion is used) and their
coefficients’ signs are exactly the same as in the hazard rate models
and are not reported here.
If we employ the reputation coefficient instead of the German VC
dummy in the hazard rate models, we obtain similar results. We pro-
ceed as before, letting all other variables in the “full” models stay the
same. For each definition of VC and each approach, we use the Akaike
criterion to determine the appropriate size of the matrix of dependent
variables. All dependent variables (with the exception of the German
VC dummy that we have removed) that are in the reduced models
described above, stay here as well. Their coefficients have the same
signs and very similar magnitudes (not reported here). Instead of the
removed German VC dummy, the domestic dummy is included for
the broad definition. Its coefficient is positive, as expected, but not
significant. For the narrow definition, the inclusion of two additional
variables is suggested: the domestic dummy and the reputation co-
efficient. Their coefficients are both highly significant with expected
signs: German firms are taken public earlier. Firms backed by a lead
VC firm with a higher reputation are financed longer. For pure VC,
exactly the same variables as above are included in the reduced model
when the reputation coefficient, instead of the German VC dummy, is
considered in the “full” model.
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4.2 Extent of the venture capitalists’ exit
The VC firms maintain their investment beyond the IPO. In this sec-
tion, we model the extent of the venture capitalists’ exit at the IPO
and their post-IPO shareholdings on the firm level. Firstly, we look
at the selling activities of the group of venture capitalists at the IPO.
Secondly, we examine the determinants of the extent of the post-IPO
venture capitalists’ holdings.
In the first part, in which the selling activities of the venture capital-
ists during the IPO are modelled, the pre-IPO holdings of the group of
venture capitalists are taken as benchmark. The dependent variable
is the fraction of these holdings retained beyond the IPO. It lies be-
tween 0 (when all venture capitalists sell their complete shareholdings
at the IPO and, thus, the fraction of old shares retained is 0) and
100 % (when none of the venture capitalists sells any shares). We use
Tobit regressions to explore the determinants of the fraction of shares
retained. Particularly, we are interested in the impact of the mar-
ket, firm, IPO and venture capitalists’ characteristics and the role of
the reputation of Designated Sponsors and leading underwriters. For
each definition of VC, we run 10 regressions with different dependent
variables.
If we suppose that venture capitalists prefer investing in young compa-
nies to which they can add a large value (instead of maintaining their
investments in more mature companies that are already listed), we
conclude that the venture capitalists’ participation beyond the IPO is
costly and that they prefer to exit as soon as possible. In this case, the
reasons why venture capitalists do not sell all their shares at the IPO
are the asymmetric information and uncertainty. The potential new
investors expect that venture capitalists as insiders retain a fraction of
their shares in order to signal the quality of the firm (see e.g. Allen and
Faulhaber, 1989 and Tykvova´, 2003). According to this hypothesis,
factors that reduce uncertainty and diminish the information asym-
metry and / or increase the optimism of the potential new investors
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should decrease the fraction retained by the venture capitalists. Thus,
the higher the opacity of the firm and the greater the uncertainty, the
larger the fraction retained.
For this reason, we assume that a hot issue market may induce larger
selling activities due to the optimism of potential investors. The un-
certainty, for which the width of the bookbuilding range, the market
value and the age of the firm are used as proxies (a wider bookbuild-
ing range, smaller or younger firm imply a larger uncertainty), should
have a positive impact on the fraction of shares retained. A high rep-
utation of venture capitalists, Designated Sponsors and underwriters
may certify the firm quality and thus diminish the uncertainty (see
e.g. Booth and Smith, 1986 or Megginson and Weiss, 1991). The
syndication of more venture capitalists and longer pre-IPO financing
periods should reduce uncertainty as well. Therefore, the necessity to
signal the firm quality should be reduced and, thus, the impact on the
fraction of shares retained by the venture capitalists negative.
Up to now, we assumed that post-IPO shareholdings incur cost for
the venture capitalists. However, if the venture capitalists expect the
revenues on the Neuer Markt to be sufficiently high, they may prefer
to profit from rising prices and not to sell their shares.
In our data, we can find confirmation for both hypotheses. When the
venture capitalists expect rising share prices (in hot issue markets)
and a high liquidity (Designated Sponsors with a high reputation),
they retain significantly larger fractions of shares. In younger firms
and in firms for which the reputation of the lead underwriter(s) is
low, the fraction sold by the venture capitalists at the IPO is smaller.
Table 9 provides the results of Tobit regressions for the determinants of
the fraction of old shares retained by the group of venture capitalists
beyond the IPO. Taking into account that the observations are not
independent, the robust variance is estimated using the Huber-White-
sandwich estimator employing two different approaches: (i) allowing
any structure of not independent observations and (ii) allowing not
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independent observations only within predetermined clusters, based
on market situation (hot vs. cold market) and industry.
In the hot issue phase, the venture capitalists retain a significantly
larger fraction of their old shareholdings beyond the IPO (highly sig-
nificant for broad and pure definitions, for the narrow definition only
weak evidence), probably in order to profit from the expected increase
in share prices. The width of the bookbuilding range has no effect. A
higher firm age at the IPO reduces information asymmetry and un-
certainty. Thus, the venture capitalists sell a larger fraction of their
shares. The good reputation of Designated Sponsors increases the
fraction retained. This finding might be explained by the venture
capitalists’ expectations that high-quality Designated Sponsors guar-
antee sufficient liquidity. Hence, they offer an opportunity for the
venture capitalists to participate on the expected increase in share
prices on the one hand as well as on the other hand make an unprob-
lematic sale of their shares possible whenever the venture capitalists
may need cash in the future. We also find evidence that high-quality
underwriters certificate the companies and allow the venture capital-
ists to sell a significantly larger fraction already at the IPO. When the
lead VC firm is from Germany, the group of venture capitalists retains
a significantly lower fraction of its old shares beyond the IPO com-
pared to firms in which the lead venture capitalist is from abroad (for
the broad definition of VC). The longer the duration of the committed
lock-up period, the larger the extent of the lock-up. The market value
has a significant positive impact on the fraction retained (for narrow
and pure definitions).
The results from the second group of regressions (dependent variable:
fraction of firm held by the venture capitalists’ after the IPO) show
in the same direction. Here, as well, we use Tobit model and conduct
10 regressions for each definition of VC. The robust variance is esti-
mated using the same estimators as in the first part. The results are
depicted in table 10. The venture capitalists take larger equity posi-
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tions during the hot issue phase and in larger firms. For the broad
definition, the impact of the length of the committed lock-up period
on the post-IPO shareholdings is significantly positive. The firm age
has a negative impact. For broad and narrow definitions, a higher rep-
utation of Designated Sponsors increases the post-IPO shareholdings
of venture capitalists. When the lead VC firm is from Germany, the
group of venture capitalists takes a less concentrated equity position
compared to firms in which the lead venture capitalist is from abroad.
The pre-IPO shareholdings have a significant impact on the post-IPO
shareholdings. Syndication sometimes has a significant positive im-
pact on the fraction held by the venture capitalists after the IPO. The
reputation of venture capitalists is significant in two cases at the 10
% level for the broad definition. In agreement with the certification
hypothesis, a higher reputation leads to lower shareholdings in these
two cases.
5 Grandstanding, value-added and certification hy-
potheses
Table 11 summarizes the main empirical findings of this paper about
the differences in the behavior between German and foreign VC firms
and indicates the relevance of the grandstanding, value-added and cer-
tification hypotheses for their explanation. Gompers (1996) shows in
an empirical investigation of the US market several differences in the
behavior of young and old VC firms. He argues that the reason for
these differences are the needs of young venture capital firms to estab-
lish their reputation in order to be able to attract capital for new funds
in the near future. He calls their behavior “grandstanding”. We try
to transmit his results on the German VC market. Since German VC
firms are typically younger and smaller than foreign VC firms investing
in Germany, this grandstanding hypothesis could offer an explanation
for their investment patterns. In our results, we can find several par-
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allels to Gompers’ results. He shows that young venture capital firms
take their portfolio firms public earlier (after shorter financing peri-
ods) than established VC firms. This corresponds to our finding that
German venture capitalists’ have shorter pre-IPO financing periods
than their foreign counterparts. This fact also explains the lower syn-
dication by German VC firms because there is a positive correlation
between the syndication level and the duration of the pre-IPO venture
capital financing. Syndication typically increases over time as new in-
vestors join the financing consortium. We can find further similarities
between his and our results: The average offering size is smaller for
young (in our case: German) VC firms. The average fraction of equity
held by the group of venture capitalists prior to the IPO is lower for
young (in our case: German) VC firms.
Contrary to Gompers, who finds that firms backed by a young VC
firm are themselves younger at the IPO, the average age of a venture-
backed company at the IPO in Germany is not significantly different
between the two groups of VC firms (for any of the three definitions
of VC). If we employ the reputation coefficient, instead of the German
VC dummy, and divide the sample into two subsamples (high vs. low
reputation), there is still no significant difference between both the
means and medians of the firm age. This finding can be explained
by the fact that German VC firms invest in later stages. Hence, in
spite of a shorter financing horizon, the age of the firms at the IPO
is not lower for firms backed by a German VC firm. Gompers further
finds differences in the underpricing. In his sample, the average un-
derpricing is higher for firms backed by a young VC firm whereas in
our sample there are no significant differences.
In Germany, the large fraction of domestic funds are not independent
private funds as in the US, but subsidiaries of insurance companies
and banks. They are often organized as public-private partnerships
(see Bascha and Walz, 2002). Therefore, the fundraising process in
Germany is, for the most part, structured differently than in the US.
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Hence, we offer an additional explanation, which we call value-added
hypothesis, for the differing investment patterns of German VC firms.
Venture capitalists participate in strategic decisions, offer advice and
provide their portfolio firms with valuable business contacts. This
non-monetary contribution increases the firm’s value. In early stages,
the venture capitalist’s managerial involvement often plays a decisive
role in the survival of a young firm. As the firm grows older, the
non-monetary contribution is less and less important. At a certain
point of time, the comparative advantage of VC firms to potential
new investors is not very high any more. A venture capitalists’ further
managerial contribution adds little value to the firm. VC firms prefer
to turn their shares into cash at this time and invest it in other firms
to which they could add more value. This explains the age similarities
of firms in both groups. The relatively little experience of German
VC firms in financing and advising firms may be the reason for their
preference to invest in more mature companies in which the needs for
their non-monetary contribution are lower than in younger firms. Both
the grandstanding and the value-added hypotheses probably play a
role in explaining the differences in the behavior of German and non-
German VC firms. Future research should examine the fundraising
process in Germany and its differences to that of the US in detail.
As prescribed by the Rules and Regulations Neuer Markt, old investors
are not allowed to sell their shares during the period of 6 months
beyond the IPO. They often commit themselves to hold their shares
for periods longer than this requirement. Old shareholders tend do this
more often when the lead VC firm is German. The inside investors in
companies backed by German venture capitalists probably try to signal
the quality of their firms by locking themselves in for longer periods
than are required. In firms backed by a lead VC firm from abroad,
the presence of a foreign venture capitalist with a large reputation
at stake serves as a certification of the firm’s quality. High-quality
underwriters play as well a certification role for the companies they
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bring public. They allow the venture capitalists to sell a significantly
larger fraction already at the IPO.
6 Conclusion
After a certain period of time, venture capitalists have to exit their
investments. The purpose of this paper is to examine some important
aspects of the investment and particularly divestment process of ven-
ture capitalists in Germany. Hereby, we concentrate on the IPO which
is considered in the literature to be the most profitable exit channel.
At the same time, it is the only divestment channel for which publicly
available data in Germany exist. Since different people understand dif-
ferent things under the term venture capital, we distinguish between
three different definitions of it and carry out our analysis separately
for all of them. We examine all venture-backed IPOs on Germany’s
Neuer Markt from its launching in March 1997 to its closing in 2003.
Our results show that large differences in the behavior of VC investors
exist (particularly for the broad and narrow definitions of VC). We
look at the differences between German and non-German VC firms in
detail. German venture capitalists in our sample tend to invest more
in IT services and media & entertainment and less in firms from the
branches internet and software. They strongly prefer German firms to
companies from abroad. They back significantly smaller offerings with
a lower capital increase at the IPO. Both the available and the used
greenshoe are smaller. The share of the available greenshoe on the
total offering volume is significantly lower as well. The pre-IPO and
post-IPO shareholdings of the group of venture capitalists are lower
and the selling intensity is higher when a German firm is the lead
venture capitalist. Non-German VC firms employ significantly more
investment rounds before they take their portfolio firms public, they
invest in firms in earlier stages and finance them longer than Ger-
man venture capitalists. They also syndicate more. German venture
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capitalists commit themselves to hold their shares after the IPO for
longer periods than venture capital firms from abroad. The grand-
standing, the value-added and the certification / signaling hypotheses
deliver hints for the explanation of some of these differences in the
investment patterns between German and non-German VC firms.
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Appendix: Hazard Models
The duration data are typically analyzed via hazard models. We use
three different hazard models to estimate the duration of the pre-
IPO venture capital investment: two parametric models (exponential,
Weibull) and a semi-parametric model (Cox). The differences between
them are in the underlying survival distributions.
The hazard rate h(t) is the conditional probability that a unit “exits”
exactly at t, given it lasts until t. Precisely, h(t) = lim
h→0
Prob(t ≤ T <
t+ h|T ≥ t)/h. The survivor function S(t) is the probability that the
duration will equal or exceed the value t.
1. The exponential hazard model
The survivor function is S(t) = exp(−λt), λ > 0. The hazard
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rate equals h(t) = λ = exp(β ′X). The hazard rate does not vary
over time.
2. The Weibull hazard model
Here, the hazard rate changes over time. It is monotonically
increasing or decreasing depending on the parameter p (that is
also estimated). The hazard rate is h(t) = λp(λt)p−1 where λ =
exp(β ′X).
3. The Cox proportional hazard model (see Cox, 1972)
The formal model is h(t) = h0(t)exp(β
′X). Every single contri-
bution to likelihood is the hazard rate for the individual k who
“exits” at t divided by the sum of the hazard rates for the indi-





The baseline hazard function is eliminated. Thus, this model
does not impose any structure on the baseline hazard h0(t). The









Since there are tied events (spells of the same length) in our
data set, we modify the numerator of the partial likelihood using
Breslow approximation (see Breslow, 1974) to account for the
multiple possible orderings. Let dj denote the multiplicity of
exits at tj and Dj the set of individuals that exit at tj. Let sj be
the sum of the vectors Xl over the individuals who fail at tj. The









We use other approximations (the Efron and the exact methods)
that deliver very similar results (not reported here).
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Table 1: Number of IPOs on Germany’s Neuer Markt and their VC backing
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total
Broad definition of VC 7 23 66 78 4 1 179
Narrow definition of VC 7 17 52 59 4 0 139
Pure VC 6 8 30 39 3 0 86
All IPOs 11 41 130 133 11 1 327
BROAD DEFINITION OF VC - indication of the Deutsche Bo¨rse AG, NARROW DEFINITION OF VC -
firms affiliated at a VC association, PURE VC - narrow definition minus bridge financing.
Table 2: Definitions of the dummy variables
INTERNET One, if the firm belongs to internet industry, zero
otherwise
IT SERVICES One, if the firm belongs to IT services, zero otherwise
MEDIA & ENTERTAINMENT One, if the firm belongs to media & entertainment
industry, zero otherwise
SOFTWARE One, if the firm belongs to software industry, zero
otherwise
TELECOMMUNICATIONS One, if the firm belongs to telecommunications indus-
try, zero otherwise
DOMESTIC One, if the firm is located in Germany, zero otherwise
SYNDICATION One, if more than one VC funds hold firm’s shares,
zero otherwise
LOCK > 6 One, if the committed lock-up period exceeds 6
months, zero otherwise
HOT ISSUE One, if the firm went public during the hot issue
perioda, zero otherwise
GERMAN VC One, if the lead venture capital firm is located in Ger-
many, zero otherwise
START-UP One, if the venture capital firm begins to finance the
company in the start-up phase, zero otherwise
aThe hot issue period was the time horizon between March 1, 1999 and November 30, 2000.
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Table 3: Lead VC firms from Germany vs. abroad - descriptive statistics
This table provides descriptive statistics for variables associated with the characteristics of the firm (PANEL A)
and the IPO (PANEL B), the pre-IPO venture capital financing (PANEL C) and the venture capitalists’ behavior
at the IPO (PANEL D). The firms are divided into two subgroups depending on whether or not the lead VC firm
is German. Further, we use three different definitions of VC: broad, narrow and pure. For each variable, the table
presents six different values (three definitions, for each definition two subsamples) for the number of observations and
the mean. Further, we conduct a standard two-sided t-test (allowing for unequal variances) to test for differences
in means between the subgroups of lead VC firms from Germany and abroad. Additionally, we use the Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test to test for the equality of medians. One, two and three asterisks indicate significance at the 10




PANEL A: Characteristics of the portfolio firms
AGE, IPO Non-German, Broad 75 12.27
German, Broad 103 11.12
0.5105 0.5607
(Years)
Non-German, Narrow 63 12.43
German, Narrow 76 11.75
0.7426 0.4190
Non-German, Pure 47 12.20
German, Pure 37 11.51
0.7657 0.8113
INTERNET Non-German, Broad 75 0.29
German, Broad 103 0.18
0.0981* 0.0894*
Non-German, Narrow 63 0.27
German, Narrow 76 0.17
0.1678 0.1602
Non-German, Pure 47 0.17
German, Pure 37 0.11
0.4151 0.4221
IT SERVICES Non-German, Broad 75 0.07
German, Broad 103 0.16
0.0562* 0.0710*
Non-German, Narrow 63 0.05
German, Narrow 76 0.16
0.0294** 0.0377**
Non-German, Pure 47 0.06
German, Pure 37 0.16
0.1726 0.1505
MEDIA & Non-German, Broad 75 0.05
German, Broad 103 0.14
0.0554* 0.0719*
ENTERTAINMENT
Non-German, Narrow 63 0.06
German, Narrow 76 0.13
0.1741 0.1858
Non-German, Pure 47 0.02
German, Pure 37 0.05
0.4519 0.4244
DOMESTIC Non-German, Broad 75 0.67
German, Broad 103 0.98
0.0000*** 0.0000***
Non-German, Narrow 63 0.70
German, Narrow 76 0.96
0.0001*** 0.0000***
Non-German, Pure 47 0.66
German, Pure 37 0.95
0.0006*** 0.0016***
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BOOK VALUE, IPO Non-German, Broad 75 7.1
German, Broad 103 5.4
0.2350 0.2909
(Euro Mil.)
Non-German, Narrow 63 6.5
German, Narrow 76 4.5
0.0991* 0.0866*
Non-German, Pure 47 5.9
German, Pure 37 6.0
0.9555 0.9533
MARKET VALUE, IPO Non-German, Broad 75 331.4
German, Broad 103 239.7
0.0705* 0.0038***
(Euro Mil.)
Non-German, Narrow 63 311.0
German, Narrow 76 196.3
0.0072*** 0.0011***
Non-German, Pure 47 249.0
German, Pure 37 233.2
0.7097 0.2697
BOOKTOMARKET, IPO Non-German, Broad 75 26.1
German, Broad 103 26.5
0.9194 0.4411
(∗10−3)
Non-German, Narrow 63 26.7
German, Narrow 76 25.9
0.8685 0.6244
Non-German, Pure 47 27.9
German, Pure 37 31.3
0.6527 0.3995
Post-IPO SHARE CAP. Non-German, Broad 75 10.55
German, Broad 103 8.24
0.2726 0.8205
(Euro Mil.)
Non-German, Narrow 63 11.15
German, Narrow 76 6.96
0.0737* 0.2533
Non-German, Pure 47 7.71
German, Pure 37 8.21
0.7594 0.6719
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PANEL B: IPO characteristics
OFFERING SIZE Non-German, Broad 75 3.25
German, Broad 103 2.09
0.0076*** 0.0002***
(Shares Mil.)
Non-German, Narrow 63 3.21
German, Narrow 76 1.94
0.0055*** 0.0005***
Non-German, Pure 47 2.95
German, Pure 37 2.35
0.1757 0.1117
OFFERING SIZE Non-German, Broad 75 65.93
German, Broad 103 44.11
0.0059*** 0.0002***
(Euro Mil.)
Non-German, Narrow 63 63.61
German, Narrow 76 40.83
0.0025*** 0.0002***
Non-German, Pure 47 53.87
German, Pure 37 52.25
0.8446 0.2897
OLD SHARES SOLD Non-German, Broad 75 325743
German, Broad 101 493950
0.5992 0.0191**
Non-German, Narrow 62 279620
German, Narrow 75 408257
0.7319 0.0044***
Non-German, Pure 46 607128
German, Pure 37 475710
0.4933 0.0865*
OLD SHARES SOLD Non-German, Broad 75 19.22
German, Broad 101 22.54
0.6190 0.5847
(in % of total offering)
Non-German, Narrow 62 19.47
German, Narrow 75 21.95
0.7583 0.3808
Non-German, Pure 46 21.08
German, Pure 37 25.43
0.6120 0.7728
AVAIL. GREENSHOE Non-German, Broad 75 455670
German, Broad 103 223606
0.0004*** 0.0000***
(Shares)
Non-German, Narrow 63 447725
German, Narrow 76 199799
0.0004*** 0.0000***
Non-German, Pure 47 411047
German, Pure 37 271475
0.0349** 0.0140**
AVAIL. GREENSHOE Non-German, Broad 75 9.07
German, Broad 103 4.69
0.0002*** 0.0000***
(Euro Mil.)
Non-German, Narrow 63 8.63
German, Narrow 76 4.23
0.0001*** 0.0000***
Non-German, Pure 47 7.46
German, Pure 37 6.05
0.2053 0.0869*
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AVAIL. GREENSHOE Non-German, Broad 75 13.76
German, Broad 103 9.85
0.0000*** 0.0000***
(in % of total offering)
Non-German, Narrow 63 13.76
German, Narrow 76 9.63
0.0000*** 0.0001***
Non-German, Pure 47 14.17
German, Pure 37 11.00
0.0051*** 0.0558*
USED GREENSHOE Non-German, Broad 75 380666
German, Broad 101 191465
0.0032*** 0.0001***
(Shares)
Non-German, Narrow 62 400251
German, Narrow 75 151763
0.0006*** 0.0000***
Non-German, Pure 46 348828
German, Pure 37 215663
0.0629* 0.0217**
USED GREENSHOE Non-German, Broad 75 7.92
German, Broad 101 4.15
0.0011*** 0.0001***
(Euro Mil.)
Non-German, Narrow 62 8.00
German, Narrow 75 3.43
0.0002*** 0.0000***
Non-German, Pure 46 6.66
German, Pure 37 5.20
0.2407 0.1215
OFFER PRICE Non-German, Broad 75 24.10
German, Broad 103 24.35
0.8927 0.8655
(Euro)
Non-German, Narrow 63 24.26
German, Narrow 76 24.06
0.9253 0.8622
Non-German, Pure 47 22.51
German, Pure 37 24.63
0.4739 0.5550
FIRST PRICE Non-German, Broad 75 37.95
German, Broad 103 40.10
0.6593 0.6757
(Euro)
Non-German, Narrow 63 38.57
German, Narrow 76 38.17
0.9439 0.9494
Non-German, Pure 47 33.88
German, Pure 37 37.78
0.5815 0.5825
UNDERPRICING Non-German, Broad 75 46.85
German, Broad 103 58.37
0.2583 0.6183
(in %)
Non-German, Narrow 63 47.13
German, Narrow 76 49.86
0.8023 0.9157
Non-German, Pure 47 37.54
German, Pure 37 41.25
0.7582 0.8287
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Table 3 - continued
p-value p-valueVARIABLE Obs. Mean
(t-test) (Wilcoxon)
PANEL C: Pre-IPO venture capital financing
No. of VC FUNDS Non-German, Broad 75 3.79
German, Broad 103 1.92
0.0000*** 0.0000***
Non-German, Narrow 63 3.11
German, Narrow 76 1.62
0.0001*** 0.0000***
Non-German, Pure 47 2.81
German, Pure 37 1.84
0.0280** 0.0017***
No. of VC FIRMSa Non-German, Broad 75 3.16
German, Broad 103 1.78
0.0004*** 0.0000***
Non-German, Narrow 63 2.41
German, Narrow 76 1.42
0.0006*** 0.0000***
Non-German, Pure 47 2.02
German, Pure 37 1.49
0.0622* 0.0099***
SYNDICATION Non-German, Broad 75 0.72
German, Broad 103 0.45
0.0002*** 0.0003***
(funds’ level)
Non-German, Narrow 63 0.75
German, Narrow 76 0.32
0.0000*** 0.0000***
Non-German, Pure 47 0.72
German, Pure 37 0.35
0.0006*** 0.0007***
No. of pre-IPO Non-German, Broad 53 2.19
German, Broad 90 1.54
0.0066*** 0.0016***
INVESTMENT ROUNDS
Non-German, Narrow 47 2.02
German, Narrow 67 1.45
0.0083*** 0.0010***
Non-German, Pure 33 2.27
German, Pure 25 2.28
0.9832 0.6540
STAGE in which Non-German, Broad 59 1.05
German, Broad 91 1.37
0.0138** 0.0102**
VC ENTEREDb
Non-German, Narrow 53 1.04
German, Narrow 67 1.46
0.0021*** 0.0018***
Non-German, Pure 37 0.62
German, Pure 28 0.71
0.4381 0.4379
Pre-IPO DURATIONc Non-German, Broad 59 25.15
German, Broad 91 16.10
0.0106** 0.0001***
(months)
Non-German, Narrow 53 23.28
German, Narrow 66 14.05
0.0049*** 0.0001***
Non-German, Pure 37 30.63
German, Pure 28 26.72
0.4257 0.0862*
atwo funds of one VC firm are considered as a single unit, bthree different stages are considered: start-up (0),
expansion (1), bridge (2), cthe duration of the pre-IPO venture capital equity financing
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PANEL D: Venture capitalists’ behavior at the IPO
LOCK > 6 Non-German, Broad 73 0.33
German, Broad 96 0.47
0.0652* 0.0675*
Non-German, Narrow 62 0.24
German, Narrow 72 0.49
0.0030*** 0.0037***
Non-German, Pure 46 0.28
German, Pure 36 0.56
0.0133** 0.0129**
Percent
Pre-IPO SHARE, All VCs Non-German, Broad 75 38.31
German, Broad 103 27.67
0.0042*** 0.0019***
Non-German, Narrow 63 32.62
German, Narrow 76 20.68
0.0004*** 0.0001***
Non-German, Pure 47 32.76
German, Pure 37 26.72
0.1594 0.1058
Pre-IPO ≥ 50 %, All VCsd Non-German, Broad 75 29.33
German, Broad 103 10.68
0.0028*** 0.0016***
Non-German, Narrow 63 17.46
German, Narrow 76 6.58
0.0550* 0.0462**
Non-German, Pure 47 12.77
German, Pure 37 10.81
0.7850 0.7848
Post-IPO SHARE, All VCs Non-German, Broad 75 23.42
German, Broad 103 15.28
0.0009*** 0.0004***
Non-German, Narrow 63 19.18
German, Narrow 76 10.48
0.0000*** 0.0000***
Non-German, Pure 47 18.79
German, Pure 37 13.43
0.0359** 0.0445**
Post-IPO ≥ 50 %, All VCse Non-German, Broad 75 9.33
German, Broad 103 3.88
0.1633 0.1371
Non-German, Narrow 63 3.17
German, Narrow 76 0.00
0.1590 0.1190
Non-German, Pure 47 4.26
German, Pure 37 0.00
0.1595 0.2068
Pre-IPO SHARE, Lead VC Non-German, Broad 75 24.40
German, Broad 103 23.17
0.6863 0.3511
Non-German, Narrow 63 22.58
German, Narrow 76 18.20
0.1229 0.0555*
Non-German, Pure 47 23.64
German, Pure 37 23.07
0.8816 0.8676
dFraction of firms in which VC firms as a group hold 50 % or more of the equity prior to the IPO. eFraction of firms
in which VC firms as a group hold 50 % or more of the equity after the IPO.
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Post-IPO SHARE, Non-German, Broad 75 15.31
German, Broad 103 12.70
0.2000 0.0421**
Lead VC
Non-German, Narrow 63 14.02
German, Narrow 76 8.93
0.0031*** 0.0017***
Non-German, Pure 47 14.26
German, Pure 37 11.23
0.1802 0.1444
RETAINED SHARES, f Non-German, Broad 75 80.91
German, Broad 103 72.23
0.0393** 0.0837*
All VCs
Non-German, Narrow 63 78.52
German, Narrow 76 72.44
0.1745 0.5325
Non-German, Pure 47 79.05
German, Pure 37 71.40
0.1908 0.5711
RETAINED SHARESfg Non-German, Broad 52 72.47
German, Broad 75 61.87
0.0356** 0.0200**
All VCs (when selling)
Non-German, Narrow 48 71.81
German, Narrow 52 59.72
0.0177** 0.0176**
Non-German, Pure 37 73.39
German, Pure 27 60.81
0.0553* 0.1102
RETAINED SHARES,f Non-German, Broad 75 80.50
German, Broad 103 71.88
0.0530* 0.1106
Lead VC
Non-German, Narrow 63 78.51
German, Narrow 76 72.30
0.1809 0.4696
Non-German, Pure 47 79.09
German, Pure 37 71.26
0.1931 0.5437
FIRMS WITH SELLINGh Non-German, Broad 75 69.33
German, Broad 103 72.82
0.6165 0.6129
Non-German, Narrow 63 76.19
German, Narrow 76 68.42
0.3097 0.3119
Non-German, Pure 47 78.72
German, Pure 37 72.97
0.5489 0.5414
fpre-IPO shareholdings = 100 %, gfor the group of firms where venture capitalists give up shares at the IPO,
hfraction of firms in which venture capitalists give up shares at the IPO
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Table 4: Number of VC funds per firm at the IPO
For each of the three definitions of VC (broad, narrow, and pure), this table depicts the number (the percentage)
of firms which are financed by 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and, finally, by more than 5 venture capital funds.
Number of VCs 1 2 3 4 5 5+
Broad definition of VC
78 37 18 20 12 13
(43.82%) (20.79%) (10.11%) (11.24%) ( 6.74%) (7.31%)
Narrow definition of VC
68 28 22 12 2 7
(48.92%) (20.14%) (15.83%) (8.63%) (1.44%) (5.04%)
Pure VC
37 19 16 5 1 6
(44.05%) (22.62%) (19.05%) (5.95%) (1.19%) (7.14%)
Table 5: Pre- and post-IPO holdings by the group of venture capitalists
This table provides the fraction of venture-backed firms in which the group of venture capitalists holds more than
50 % of the equity before the IPO and after the IPO for all three definitions of VC (broad, narrow, and pure).
Further, it shows the average pre-IPO and post-IPO equity holdings of the group of venture capitalists. The results
are compared to Megginson and Weiss (1991) and Barry et. al (1990), denoted by MW and BM.
pre-IPO≥ 50% post-IPO≥ 50 average pre-IPO average post-IPO
Broad definition of VC 18.4 % 6.1 % 32.0 % 18.6 %
Narrow definition of VC 11.5 % 1.4 % 26.0 % 14.4 %
Pure VC 11.6 % 2.3 % 29.6 % 16.2 %
MWa 28.0 % 8.4 % 36.6 % 26.3 %
BMb 24.4 % n.a. 34.3 % 24.6 %
a Megginson and Weiss, 1991, b Barry et al., 1990.
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Table 6: The venture capitalists’ behavior in the course of the IPO
This table presents the fractions of venture-backed firms in which the venture capitalists’ shareholdings
(i) decrease, (ii) do not change and (iii) increase during the IPO for all three definitions of VC (broad,
narrow, and pure). It depicts the average changes for each group as well.
Percent of firms Average change
Broad Narrow Pure Broad Narrow Pure
definition definition definition definition definition definition
Change in shareholdings
Decrease 70.9 % 72.0 % 76.2 % -33.8 % -34.5 % -31.9 %
No change 23.5 % 23.0 % 20.2 % 0% 0% 0%
Increase 5.6 % 5.0 % 3.6 % + 1654.3 % +2343.1% +5252.4%
Table 7: The venture capitalists’ reputation
This table shows the average reputation coefficient of lead VC firms from Germany and abroad
for all three definitions of VC (broad, narrow, and pure). The reputation coefficient depends
equally on the size and the age of the VC firm. The reputation scale ranges from 1 to 5,
where 1 is the best and 5 the worst reputation. We conduct a standard two-sided t-test
(allowing for unequal variances) to test for differences in means between the subgroups of lead
VC firms from Germany and abroad. Additionally, we use the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test to




REPUTATION Non-German, Broad 75 3.09
German, Broad 103 4.00
0.0000*** 0.0006***
COEFFICIENT
Non-German, Narrow 63 2.37
German, Narrow 76 3.60
0.0000*** 0.0000***
Non-German, Pure 47 2.40
German, Pure 37 3.46
0.0002*** 0.0005***
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Table 8: Hazard rate models
This table depicts the results of hazard rate models for the dependent variable: duration of
the pre-IPO venture capital financing (for three definitions of VC: broad, narrow, and pure).
The choice of explanatory variables in each model is based on the optimization of the Akaike
information criterion. If the estimated coefficient is higher than 0, then this variable increases
the hazard ratio, and vice versa. One, two and three asterisks indicate significance at the 10
%, 5 % and 1 % level or better.




GERMAN VC 0.47*** 0.46*** 0.48***
START-UP -0.80*** -0.78*** -0.77***
INTERNET 0.79*** 0.77*** 0.77***
MEDIA & ENTERTAINMENT 0.83*** 0.82*** 0.87***
TELECOMMUNICATIONS -0.63* -0.61* -0.58
Number of firms 150 150 150
Model p-value 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
Narrow VC
GERMAN VC 0.56*** 0.51*** 0.59***
START-UP -0.42* -0.36 -0.48*
INTERNET 1.15*** 0.93*** 1.18***
MEDIA & ENTERTAINMENT 1.96*** 1.62*** 1.92***
Number of firms 119 119 119
Model p-value 0.0000*** 0.0000*** 0.0000***
Pure VC
INTERNET 1.25*** 0.67* 1.30***
MEDIA & ENTERTAINMENT 2.53*** 1.43** 2.86***
Number of firms 65 65 65
Model p-value 0.0007*** 0.0599* 0.0004***
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